Screen LibrarySocial choice and welfare /
This volume comprises papers presented at the Symposium on Collective Choice, by leading experts in this field. It presents recent advances in Social Choice Theory and Welfare Economics. The papers are classified in two broad groups: (1) those dealing with the ethical aspects of the theory of social...
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| Corporate Authors: | |
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| Group Author: | ; |
| Published: |
North-Holland Pub. Co. ; Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co.,
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| Publisher Address: | Amsterdam ; New York : New York : |
| Publication Dates: | 1983. |
| Literature type: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Series: |
Contributions to economic analysis ;
145 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/bookseries/05738555/145 |
| Summary: |
This volume comprises papers presented at the Symposium on Collective Choice, by leading experts in this field. It presents recent advances in Social Choice Theory and Welfare Economics. The papers are classified in two broad groups: (1) those dealing with the ethical aspects of the theory of social choice and (2) those concerned with the positive aspects. The papers in the first part are concerned with the Arrow-type aggregation problem or aspects of it and with more specific questions relating to optimality, justice and welfare. In part II several papers discuss the problem of strategic misre. |
| Carrier Form: | 1 online resource (xii, 323 pages) : illustrations. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: |
9781483290591 148329059X |
| Index Number: | HB846 |
| CLC: | F062.6 |
| Contents: |
Front Cover; Social Choice and Welfare; Copyright Page; Introduction to the series; Preface; Table of Contents; List of participants; Introduction; References; PART IA: THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHOICE: THE AGGREGATION PROBLEM; CHAPTER 1. Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended co-domains; 1. Introduction; 2. Notation; 3. From individual preferences to social preferences; 4. Dictators and oligarchies; 5. Hypothesis on individual preferences; 6. Arrow's theorem; 7. Proof of the theorem; 8. Remarks about weak orders; References. CHAPTER 2. Pivotal voters: A simple proof of Arrow's theoremCHAPTER 3. The structure of general probabilistic group decision rules; 1. Introduction; 2. Notation and definitions; 3. The structure of GSWFs; 4. Stochastic transitivity; 5. Concluding remarks; Appendix; References; CHAPTER 4. Positive association and its relatives; 1. Introduction; 2. The context; 3. The founder and immediate family; 4. Genealogy; 5. A weaker stream; 6. An alternative view; 7. Interconnections; 8. Comparisons with the usual definitions; 9. Some uses of the properties; 10. Concluding remarks; References. CHAPTER 5. On the use of ultrafilters in social choice theory1. Notations and preliminaries; 2. A theorem; 3. Comments; References; CHAPTER 6. Social choice and game theory: Recent results with a topological approach; 1. Introduction; 2. Social choice; 3. Game theory; Remark.; References; CHAPTER 7. Contractibility and public decision-making; 1. Introduction; 2. Basic definitions and concepts; 3. Examples of preferences spaces; 4. Properties of contractible preference spaces; References; PART IB: THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHOICE: JUSTICE, OPTIMALITY, AND WELFARE. CHAPTER 8. Resolving conflicting views of justice in social choice0. Introduction; 1. Extended preferences, equity, and justice; 2. Non-paternalism and the lexical combination of preferences; 3. Discussion and remarks on the literature; References; CHAPTER 9. Some broader issues of social choice; 1. Introduction; 2. Preferences vs. welfare: a distinction; 3. Preference or welfare: which is the ingredient for social choice?; 4. An argument for a utilitarian social welfare function; 5. Who are the individuals?; 6. Disturbing implications and a way out. Appendix: On maximizing utility sum vs. meanReferences; CHAPTER 10. Ex-post optimality as a dynamically consistent objective for collective choice under uncertainty; 1. Introduction: ex-ante and ex-post; 2. Collective dynamic choice under uncertainty; 3. Dynamic social welfare functionals; 4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives and expected ex-post utilitarianism; 5. Consistency between ex-ante and ex-post; 6. Ex-post collective choice: some reservations; 7. Ex-post collective choice including ex-ante utilities; 8. Conclusions; References. |