Appointing central bankers:the politics of monetary policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union
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Main Authors: | |
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Published: |
Cambridge University Press,
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Publisher Address: | Cambridge, U.K. New York |
Publication Dates: | 2003. |
Literature type: | Book |
Language: | English |
Series: |
Political economy of institutions and decisions |
Subjects: | |
Carrier Form: | xiv, 160 p. 24 cm.: ill. |
ISBN: | 0521823331 |
Index Number: | F825 |
CLC: |
F825.00 F835.0 F837.123 F827.120 |
Call Number: | F837.123/C456 |
Contents: |
Based on the author's thesis (doctoral)--Stanford University. Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-156) and index. A formal model of the appointment process -- Estimating monetary policy preferences -- Empirically testing the model's predictions -- Appointments to the European Central Bank -- The origins of the Federal Reserve appointment process -- Conclusions. |