Screen LibraryGlobal carbon pricing : the path to climate cooperation /
After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a "pledge and review" approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an altern...
Saved in:
| Group Author: | ; ; ; |
|---|---|
| Published: |
MIT Press,
|
| Publisher Address: | Cambridge, MA : |
| Publication Dates: | [2017] |
| Literature type: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Summary: |
After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a "pledge and review" approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a "common commitment" scheme is more effective than an "individual commitment" scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity ("we will if you will"). The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference. -- |
| Carrier Form: | xv, 252 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: |
9780262036269 0262036266 |
| Index Number: | HJ5316 |
| CLC: | X196 |
| Call Number: | X196/G562-2 |
| Contents: |
Why Paris did not solve the climate dilemma / Price carbon : I will if you will / Reflections on the international coordination of carbon pricing / Global carbon pricing / The case for pricing greenhouse gas emissions / Overcoming the Copenhagen failure with flexible commitments / Climate clubs and carbon pricing / How a minimum carbon price commitment might help to internalize the global warming externality / Climate policy at an impasse / Effective institutions against climate change / From the Paris agreement to the carbon convergence / An international carbon-price commitment promotes cooperation / |