Testimony, trust, and authority /
Much of what we know is acquired by taking things on the word of other people whom we trust and treat as authorities concerning what to believe. But what exactly is it to take someone's word for something? What is it to treat another as an authority concerning what to believe, and what is it to...
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Main Authors: | |
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Corporate Authors: | |
Published: |
Oxford University Press,
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Publisher Address: | Oxford ; New York : |
Publication Dates: | 2011. |
Literature type: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: |
http://www.iresearchbook.cn/f/ebook/detail?id=0f3dda8fab92466b8b130dbb79b09a1c |
Summary: |
Much of what we know is acquired by taking things on the word of other people whom we trust and treat as authorities concerning what to believe. But what exactly is it to take someone's word for something? What is it to treat another as an authority concerning what to believe, and what is it to then trust this person for the truth? Benjamin McMyler argues that philosophers have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of our epistemic dependence on the word of others. |
Carrier Form: | 1 online resource (viii, 178 pages) |
Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 171-175) and index. |
ISBN: |
9780199794362 9780199794331 |
Index Number: | BD238 |
CLC: | B017 |
Contents: | Testimony as a philosophical problem -- Knowing at second hand -- Three models of epistemic dependence -- Trustung a person -- Authority, autonomy, and second-personal reasons. |