Screen LibraryRisk propagation assessment for network security application to airport communication network design /
The focus of this book is risk assessment methodologies for network architecture design. The main goal is to present and illustrate an innovative risk propagation-based quantitative assessment tool. This original approach aims to help network designers and security administrators to design and build...
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| Group Author: | ; |
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| Literature type: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Series: |
Focus series in networks and telecommunications
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| Online Access: |
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781118579947 |
| Summary: |
The focus of this book is risk assessment methodologies for network architecture design. The main goal is to present and illustrate an innovative risk propagation-based quantitative assessment tool. This original approach aims to help network designers and security administrators to design and build more robust and secure network topologies. As an implementation case study, the authors consider an aeronautical network based on AeroMACS (Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System) technology. AeroMACS has been identified as the wireless access network for airport surface communication. |
| Carrier Form: | 1 online resource (xviii, 119 p.) : ill. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (p. [111]-115) and index. |
| ISBN: |
9781118579947 (electronic bk.) 1118579941 (electronic bk.) 9781118578735 (electronic bk.) 1118578732 (electronic bk.) 1118581016 (electronic bk.) 9781118581018 (electronic bk.) |
| Index Number: | TK5105 |
| CLC: | TP393.08 |
| Contents: |
Title Page; Contents; LIST OF FIGURES; LIST OF TABLES; INTRODUCTION; PART 1. NETWORK SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT; CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION SYSTEMSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS; 1.1. On the importance of network security for network designers; 1.2. On the impact of risk assessment in the decision-making process for network security designers; 1.3. Quantitative versus qualitative risk assessment approaches; 1.4. Network security risk propagation concept; 1.4.1. Impact of node correlation; 1.4.2. Network security risk transitivity 1.4.3. Network security risk propagation illustrative caseCHAPTER 2. SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENTBACKGROUND; 2.1. Qualitative security risk management methods; 2.1.1. CRAMM; 2.1.2. OCTAVE; 2.1.3. EBIOS; 2.1.4. MEHARI; 2.1.5. CORAS; 2.1.6. Discussion; 2.2. Quantitative security risk assessment approaches; 2.3. Toward a quantitative propagation-based risk assessment methodology; CHAPTER 3. A QUANTITATIVE NETWORK RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY BASED ON RISK PROPAGATION; 3.1. Quantifying methodology parameters; 3.1.1. Network risk decomposition; 3.1.2. Node value; 3.1.3. Enhanced node value 3.1.4. Impact of threats3.1.5. Likelihood of threats; 3.2. Network security risk assessment process; 3.3. Conclusion; PART 2. APPLICATION TO AIRPORT COMMUNICATION NETWORK DESIGN; CHAPTER 4. THE AEROMACS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN THE SESAR PROJECT; 4.1. Overview of the European SESAR project; 4.2. Overview of aeronautical communications operating concept and requirements; 4.3. Introduction to the AeroMACS communication system; 4.3.1. AeroMACS protocol stack; 4.3.2. AeroMACS reference network architecture; 4.3.3. AeroMACS security considerations; 4.3.3.1. Analysis of AeroMACS securityweaknesses 4.3.4. AeroMACS reference network topology4.3.4.1. Isolated AeroMACS network architecture; 4.3.4.2. End-to-end AeroMACS network architecture; CHAPTER 5. AERONAUTICAL NETWORK CASE STUDY; 5.1. Experimental parameters; 5.1.1. Testbed infrastructure; 5.1.2. Aeronautical node values instantiation; 5.1.3. Aeronautical services instantiation; 5.1.4. Isolated vs. end-to-end emulation scenarios; 5.2. AeroMACS case study: experimental results; 5.2.1. Main inputs for emulation scenarios; 5.2.2. Isolated AeroMACS scenario: preliminary results; 5.2.2.1. Individual risks; 5.2.2.2. Propagated risks 5.2.2.3. Node and network risks5.2.3. Isolated AeroMACS scenario: EAP vs. RSA sub-scenario; 5.2.4. Preliminary AeroMACS security enhancement guidance; 5.2.5. AeroMACS implementation improvements: isolated scenario without operational server vulnerabilities; 5.2.5.1. Experimental inputs; 5.2.5.2. Network topology; 5.2.5.3. Vulnerability statistics; 5.2.5.4. Individual risk results; 5.2.5.5. Propagated risk results; 5.2.5.6. Network risk results; 5.2.6. AeroMACS topological improvements: isolated scenario with two ASN gateways; 5.2.6.1. Experimental inputs; 5.2.6.2. Network topology |