Screen LibraryThe new systems competition
Competition between companies tends to be beneficial for the general public, but is this also true for competition between states in a world with global financial markets, low transport costs, and increasing migration? In this book, Sinn provides a solid economic analysis of the competitive forces a...
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| Literature type: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Series: |
Yrjö Jahnsson lectures
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| Online Access: |
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9780470774175 |
| Summary: |
Competition between companies tends to be beneficial for the general public, but is this also true for competition between states in a world with global financial markets, low transport costs, and increasing migration? In this book, Sinn provides a solid economic analysis of the competitive forces at work and addresses how they affect public goods provision, income redistribution, environmental policy, safety standards, banking regulation and even competition policy itself. Identifying the deficiencies of the competition between systems, the author develops a number of correcting policy measures ranging from specific harmonization proposals to rules that would help make competition work. |
| Carrier Form: | xii, 228 p. : ill. ; 22 cm. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (p. [208]-217) and indexes. |
| ISBN: |
9780470774175 0470774177 1405142057 9781405142052 1280238119 9781280238116 |
| Index Number: | HF1414 |
| CLC: | F115 |
| Contents: | Cover -- Table of Contents -- Table and Figures -- Preface -- 1 Competition Among States -- THE NEW SYSTEMS COMPETITION -- THE SELECTION PRINCIPLE -- INEFFICIENT GOVERNMENTS AND SYSTEMS COMPETITION -- SYSTEMS ECONOMICS AND THE HIERARCHY OF COMPETITIVE PROCESSES -- SYSTEMS COMPETITION: A CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLE FOR EUROPE? -- THE EURO AND THE INTEGRATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS -- MIGRATION IN EUROPE -- QUO VADIS EUROPE? -- 2 Taxes and Public Infrastructure Goods -- COMPETITION BETWEEN FISCAL SYSTEMS -- THE STANDARD ARGUMENT -- COMPETITION WITH INFRASTRUCTURE GOODS -- FISCAL COMPETITION AND IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS -- THE SOCIAL OPTIMUM -- WHO PAYS FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE? -- THE SELECTION PRINCIPLE, THE THEORY OF CLUBS AND THE RACE BELOW THE BOTTOM -- TAX HARMONIZATION AND THE OVERPROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS -- SELF-FINANCING CONSTRAINTS AND AVERAGE COST PRICING -- A CRITIQUE OF THE UNDERPROVISION HYPOTHESIS -- RESIDENCE TAXES -- DIVIDEND TAXES AND EQUITY TRAPS -- EXISTENCE PROBLEMS -- POLICY IMPLICATIONS -- Appendix to Chapter 2 Criticism of the Zodrow and Mieszkowski Infrastructure Model -- 3 The Erosion of the Welfare State -- GLOBALIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE -- INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND THE SELECTION PRINCIPLE: AN INSURANCE THEORETIC INTERPRETATION -- REDISTRIBUTION AS AN ALLOCATIVE STATE RESPONSIBILITY: A SIMPLE MODEL -- THE END OF THE WELFARE STATE IN TAX COMPETITION -- THE HOME COUNTRY PRINCIPLE -- Appendix to Chapter 3 The Non-Existence of a Market for Wage Insurance -- 4 Social Dumping in the Transformation Process? -- THE ACCUSATION OF SOCIAL DUMPING -- REDISTRIBUTION VS. WAGES IN KIND -- WHY ARE THE DIFFERENCES IN DIRECT AND INDIRECT WAGE COSTS SO HIGH? -- A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE ECONOMIC CATCHING-UP PROCESS -- THE POLICY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT -- THE OVERALL WELFARE OPTIMUM -- THE PROPERTIES OF THE CATCHING-UP PROCESS -- LESSONS FROM GERMAN UNIFICATION -- WHY LOW WAGES AND SOCIAL STANDARDS DO NOT INDICATE SOCIAL DUMPING -- 5 Ecological Competition -- ECOLOGICAL DUMPING OR EXCESSIVELY GREEN POLICIES? -- CONDITIONS FOR A FUNCTIONING ECOLOGICAL COMPETITION -- ECOLOGICAL DUMPING WITH INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVER EFFECTS -- POLLUTION CERTIFICATES, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE RENT DISSIPATION EFFECT -- ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS -- THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY EXTERNALITIES: A SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION -- POLICY IMPLICATIONS -- 6 The Competition of Product Standards -- CASSIS DE DIJON AND DEREGULATION COMPETITION -- THE LEMONS PROBLEM -- SIMPLE MODEL OF PRIVATE QUALITY COMPETITION -- AN ALLOCATIVE EXPLANATION OF THE STATE REGULATION OF QUALITY -- THE COMPETITION OF LAXITY -- POLICY IMPLICATIONS -- Appendix to Chapter 6 The Properties of the EE Curve in Figure 6.1 -- 7 Limited Liability, Risk-Taking and the Competition of Bank Regulators -- BANKING RISKS -- LEMON BONDS -- A NOTE ON THE LITERATURE ON LIMITED LIABILITY AND RISK-TAKING -- BANKING WITH UNLIMITED LIABILITY: THE BASIC MODEL -- LEMON BANKING AND THE BLOOS RULE -- WELFARE IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIMAL REGULATION -- THE COMPETITION OF BANKING REGULATION -- THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND EU ON THE RIGHT TRACK -- 8 The Competition of Competition Rules -- A TOTTERING CREED -- REGULATING THE M. |