The politics of IMF lending

Michael Breen examines how the economic exposure of the IMF's large shareholders affects its lending and conditionality.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Breen, Michael.
Published:
Literature type: Electronic Software eBook
Language: English
Series: International political economy series
Subjects:
Online Access: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137263810
Summary: Michael Breen examines how the economic exposure of the IMF's large shareholders affects its lending and conditionality.
Item Description: Electronic book text.
Epublication based on: 9781137263803, 2013.
Carrier Form: 232 p. : 19 b&w, line drawings, 27.
ISBN: 9781137263803
9781137263810 :
1137263814 :
CLC: F821.6
Contents: 1. Introduction PART I: THEORY 2. Who Controls the IMF? 3. Domestic Interests and IMF Programs 4. The Impact of the Shareholders on IMF Programs PART II: EVIDENCE 5. Testing the Argument 6. IMF Lending 7. IMF Lending and the Crisis in Europe 8. IMF Conditionality 9. IMF Conditionality and the Asian Crisis PART III: IMPLICATIONS 10. Theory, Evidence and Reform.