Advanced DPA theory and practice : towards the security limits of secure embedded circuits /

Advanced DPA Theory and Practice provides a thorough survey of new physical leakages of embedded systems, namely the power and the electromagnetic emanations. The book presents a thorough analysis about leakage origin of embedded system. This book examines the systematic approach of the different as...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Peeters, Eric
Corporate Authors: SpringerLink (Online service)
Published: Springer,
Publisher Address: New York, NY :
Publication Dates: 2013.
Literature type: eBook
Language: English
Subjects:
Online Access: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6783-0
Summary: Advanced DPA Theory and Practice provides a thorough survey of new physical leakages of embedded systems, namely the power and the electromagnetic emanations. The book presents a thorough analysis about leakage origin of embedded system. This book examines the systematic approach of the different aspects and advanced details about experimental setup for electromagnetic attack. The author discusses advanced statistical methods to successfully attack embedded devices such as high-order attack, template attack in principal subspaces, machine learning methods. The book includes theoretical framework to define side-channel based on two metrics: mutual information and success rate.
Carrier Form: 1 online resource
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN: 9781461467830 (electronic bk.)
1461467837 (electronic bk.)
Index Number: TK7895
CLC: TP309
Contents: Secure Embedded Devices and Their Side Channels.
Side-Channel Cryptanalysis: A Brief Survey --
Techniques of Measurements.
CMOS Devices: Sources and Models of Emanation --
Measurement of the Power Consumption --
Electromagnetic Leakage --
Statistical Tools and Higher Order Attacks.
Statistical Tools --
Higher Order Attacks --
Towards Theoretical Prediction of Side-Channel Analysis.
Toward the Evaluation of an Implementation Against Side-Channel Attacks --
General Conclusion and Possible Further Directions.