Screen LibraryMathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures /
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathe...
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| Main Authors: | |
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| Corporate Authors: | |
| Published: |
Princeton University Press,
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| Publisher Address: | Princeton, N.J. : |
| Publication Dates: |
[2008] ©2008 |
| Literature type: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Edition: | Course Book. |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400835591 http://www.degruyter.com/doc/cover/9781400835591.jpg |
| Summary: |
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods. |
| Carrier Form: | 1 online resource (392 pages) : illustrations |
| ISBN: | 9781400835591 |
| Index Number: | JF1001 |
| CLC: | D034.4-05 |
| Contents: |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice -- 2 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory -- 3 Electing a Single Winner: Combining Approval and Preference -- 4 Electing Multiple Winners: Constrained Approval Voting -- 5 Electing Multiple Winners: The Minimax Procedure -- 6 Electing Multiple Winners: Minimizing Misrepresentation -- 7 Selecting Winners in Multiple Elections -- 8 Selecting a Governing Coalition in a Parliament -- 9 Allocating Cabinet Ministries in a Parliament -- 10 Allocating Indivisible Goods: Help the Worst- Off or Avoid Envy? -- 11 Allocating a Single Homogeneous Divisible Good: Divide- the- Dollar -- 12 Allocating Multiple Homogeneous Divisible Goods: Adjusted Winner -- 13 Allocating a Single Heterogeneous Good: Cutting a Cake -- 14 Allocating Divisible and Indivisible Goods -- 15 Summary and Conclusions -- Glossary -- References -- Index. |