Screen LibraryRational choice using imprecise probabilities and utilities /
An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a...
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| Main Authors: | |
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| Published: |
Cambridge University Press,
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| Publisher Address: | Cambridge, United Kingdom : |
| Publication Dates: | 2021. |
| Literature type: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Series: |
Cambridge elements. Elements in decision theory and philosophy,
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| Subjects: | |
| Summary: |
An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement. |
| Carrier Form: | 72 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages [69]-72). |
| ISBN: |
9781108713504 1108713505 |
| Index Number: | HM495 |
| CLC: | C912.68 |
| Call Number: | C912.68/W425 |
| Contents: | Introduction -- Imprecision -- Rational imprecision -- Probabilism -- The expected-utility principle -- Norms for imprecise attitudes -- The permissive principle of choice -- Sequences of choices -- Choices in games of strategy -- Conclusion. |