Formal theories of politics : mathematical modelling in political science /

Formal Theories of Politics demonstrates the role of formal mathematical models in political science, and aims to convey a sense of the questions and methods which govern the political science research agenda. While there is still much interest in empirical patterns of voting behaviour and public op...

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate Authors: Elsevier Science & Technology.
Group Author: Johnson, P. E. (Paul E.) (Editor); Rodin, Ervin Y., 1932- (Editor)
Published: Pergamon Press,
Publisher Address: Oxford ; New York :
Publication Dates: [1989]
©1989
Literature type: eBook
Language: English
Series: International series in modern applied mathematics and computer science ; volume 20
Subjects:
Online Access: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780080372433
Summary: Formal Theories of Politics demonstrates the role of formal mathematical models in political science, and aims to convey a sense of the questions and methods which govern the political science research agenda. While there is still much interest in empirical patterns of voting behaviour and public opinion data, there has been substantial growth in emphasis on mathematical theory as a technique for the derivation of testable hypotheses. Topics discussed include: optimal candidate strategies and equilibria in competitive elections; voting agendas and parliamentary procedure in the multidimensional events; revolution, repression and inequality as outputs of dynamics systems. The mathematical techniques are widely varied, including game theory, functional analysis, differential equations, expert systems, stochastic processes and statistical models.
Item Description: "Special issue of the journal Mathematical and computer modelling, volume 12, number 4/5"--Verso of title page
Carrier Form: 1 online resource (vii, pages 397-600) : illustrations.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN: 9781483297743
1483297748
Index Number: JA73
CLC: D0
Contents: Front Cover; Pergamon Titles of Related Interest; Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; EDITORIAL FOREWORD; FORMAL THEORIES OF POLITICS: THE SCOPE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING IN POLITICAL SCIENCE; A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODELS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE; ABOUT THE ARTICLES; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; PART 1: MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODELS OFLEGISLATIVE DECISION; CHAPTER 1. LIMITS ON AGENDA CONTROL INSPATIAL VOTING GAMES; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. AGENDA CONTROL; 3. MAJORITY RULE IN SPATIAL VOTING GAMES; 4. AGENDA PROPOSITIONS; 5. CONCLUSIONS.
THE CASE OF SYMMETRIC f(x) AND POLITICAL PARTIESDISCUSSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4. UNDOMINATED CANDIDATE STRATEGIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE VOTING RULES; INTRODUCTION; VOTING METHODS; CANDIDATE STRATEGIES; RESULTS; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; APPENDIX; CHAPTER 5. THE LOCATION OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF A NEW SPATIAL MODEL OF ELECTIONS INTRODUCTION; AN APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY FOR TESTING SPATIAL THEORY; SCALING THE CANDIDATES IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION; ADDING THE VOTERS TO THE SPACE; A PROBABILISTIC EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE CANDIDATES; CONCLUSION; REFERENCES.
Chapter 6. a model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences1. introduction; 2. the optimality of a tweedle-dum response to tweedle-dee; 3. the challenger's optimal direction and the incumbent's optimal position; 4. the pareto optimality of the incumbent's location; references; chapter 7. reputational dynamics in spatial competition; 1. introduction; 2. the reputation model; 3. incumbent-challenger equilibrium; 4. reputational dynamics in spatial competition-overview; 5. the evolution of positions and electoral probabilities over time; 6. summary; references; appendix.
Part 3: game and decision theorychapter 8. political decision making with costly and imperfect information; 1. introduction; 2. the model; 3. uniqueness of the solution to the functional equation; 4. the effects of risk and information costs; 5. conclusions; references; appendix; chapter 9. advantageous multiple rent seeking; 1. introduction; 2. the model; 3. equilibrium analysis; 4. an extension: heterogeneous objects; 5. summary; references; chapter 10. the geographical imperatives of the balance of power in 3-country systems; 1. introduction; 2. an initial model; 3. incorporating geography.