Screen LibraryLaw, economics, and game theory /
"This book considers three relationships: law and economics; economics and game theory; and game theory and law. Economists teach lawyers that economic principles cut across and integrate seemingly different legal subjects such as contracts, torts, and property. Correspondingly, lawyers teach e...
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| Main Authors: | |
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| Published: |
Lexington Books,
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| Publisher Address: | Lanham, Maryland : |
| Publication Dates: | [2018] |
| Literature type: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Summary: |
"This book considers three relationships: law and economics; economics and game theory; and game theory and law. Economists teach lawyers that economic principles cut across and integrate seemingly different legal subjects such as contracts, torts, and property. Correspondingly, lawyers teach economists that legal rationality is a separate and distinct decision-making process that can be formalized by behavioral rules that are parallel to and comparable with the behavioral rules of economic rationality, that efficiency often must be constrained by legal goals such as equal protection of the laws, due process, and horizontal and distributional equity, and that the general case methodology of economics vs. the hard case methodology of law for determining the truth or falsity of economic theories and theorems sometimes conflict. [This book focuses] on economic analysis of judges' decisions in common law cases and have been mostly limited to contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and suit and settlement. There is usually no discussion of the many areas of law that require cooperative action such as is needed to provide economic infrastructure, control public 'bad' type externalities, and make legislation. Game theory provides the bridge between competitive markets and the missing discussion of cooperative action in law and economics. How? Competitive markets are examples (subset) of the prisoners' dilemma, which explains the conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation both in economic markets and in legislative bodies and demonstrates the need for social infrastructure and regulation of pollution and global warming."-- |
| Carrier Form: | vii, 383 pages : illustrations ; 27 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 367-374) and index. |
| ISBN: |
9781498549080 (hardback) : 149854908X (hardback) |
| Index Number: | K487 |
| CLC: | D90-056 |
| Call Number: | D90-056/C578 |
| Contents: | Pareto efficiency and kaldor-hicks criterion compared -- Rational economic behavior and logic defined -- Judicial use of economic rationality (efficiency) -- Equal protection and lexical constraints on efficiency -- Legal rationality and logic defined -- When are law and economics consistent (isomorphic)? -- Prisoners' dilemma and introduction to game theory -- Market and government failures as prisoners' dilemmas -- Five requirements for competitive markets -- In the long run we are all dead -- Rottenberg's theorem: effect of a change in property rights on free markets -- Coase's tactual theorems: property rights, liability rules, and mutually interfering activities -- Calabresi's criteria for allocating accident costs common to several activities -- Posner's economic analysis of the common law -- Risk, insurance, judge hand test, and value of a statistical life -- Incomplete information: adverse selection, moral hazard, and principal-agent problem -- Game theoretic framework for law and economics of civil obligation -- Torts: negligence and products liability -- Strict rules, competitive market contract model -- Discretionary standards, imperfect competition contract model -- Decision theory, suit, and settlement. |