Screen LibraryCommon pool resources : strategic behavior, inefficiencies, and incomplete information /
"Common pool resources (CPRs) include, for instance, fishing grounds, irrigation systems, forests, and the atmosphere. Now more than ever, how we responsibly share and use those goods is a vital issue. This textbook introduces students of economics, business, and policy studies to the key issue...
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| Main Authors: | |
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| Group Author: | |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press,
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| Publisher Address: | Cambridge, United Kingdom : |
| Publication Dates: | 2022. |
| Literature type: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Summary: |
"Common pool resources (CPRs) include, for instance, fishing grounds, irrigation systems, forests, and the atmosphere. Now more than ever, how we responsibly share and use those goods is a vital issue. This textbook introduces students of economics, business, and policy studies to the key issues in the field. It uses a game-theory approach to help readers understand the mathematical representation of how to find equilibrium behavior in CPRs, how to identify the socially optimal appropriation, and how to measure the inefficiencies that arise. Algebra and calculus steps are clearly explained, so students can more easily reproduce the analysis and apply it in their own research. Finally, the book also summarizes experimental studies that tested theoretical results in controlled environments, introducing readers to a literature that has expanded over the last decades, and provides references for further reading"-- |
| Carrier Form: | xviii, 204 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-202) and index. |
| ISBN: |
9781108926270 1108926274 9781108831031 1108831036 |
| Index Number: | HC79 |
| CLC: | X196 |
| Call Number: | X196/E775 |
| Contents: | Introduction -- Common pool resources in a static stetting -- Common pool resources in a dynamic setting -- Entry deterrence in the commons -- Repeated interaction in the commons -- Commons under incomplete information -- Signaling in the commons. |