Screen LibraryHidden games : the surprising power of game theory to explain irrational human behavior /
"We like to think of ourselves as rational. This idea is the foundation for classical economic analysis of human behavior, including the awesome achievements of game theory. But as behavioral economics shows, most behavior doesn't seem rational at all--which, unfortunately, casts doubt on...
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| Main Authors: | |
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| Group Author: | |
| Published: |
Basic Books,
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| Publisher Address: | New York, NY : |
| Publication Dates: | 2022. |
| Literature type: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Edition: | First edition. |
| Subjects: | |
| Summary: |
"We like to think of ourselves as rational. This idea is the foundation for classical economic analysis of human behavior, including the awesome achievements of game theory. But as behavioral economics shows, most behavior doesn't seem rational at all--which, unfortunately, casts doubt on game theory's real-world credibility. In Hidden Games, Moshe Hoffman and Erez Yoeli find a surprising middle ground between the hyperrationality of classical economics and the hyper-irrationality of behavioral economics. They call it hidden games. Reviving game theory, Hoffman and Yoeli use it to explain our most puzzling behavior, from the mechanics of Stockholm syndrome and internalized misogyny to why we help strangers and have a sense of fairness. Fun and powerfully insightful, Hidden Games is an eye-opening argument for using game theory to explain all the irrational things we think, feel, and do." -- Amazon.com. |
| Carrier Form: | v, 360 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 313-339) and index. |
| ISBN: |
9781541619470 1541619471 9781529376821 1529376823 9781529376838 1529376831 |
| Index Number: | HB144 |
| CLC: | O225 |
| Call Number: | O225/H711 |
| Contents: | Introduction -- Learning -- Three Useful Distinctions -- Sex Ratios: The gold standard for using game theory -- Hawk-Dove and Rights -- Costly Signaling and Aesthetics -- Buried Signals and Modesty -- Evidence Games and Spin -- Motivated Reasoning -- The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Altruism -- Norm Enforcement -- Categorical Norms -- Higher-Order Beliefs -- Subgame Perfection and Justice -- The Hidden Role of Primary Rewards. |