Screen LibraryA long-run collaboration on long-run games /
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring th...
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| Corporate Authors: | |
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| Group Author: | ; |
| Published: |
World Scientific Pub. Co.,
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| Publisher Address: | Singapore : |
| Publication Dates: | 2009. |
| Literature type: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/6880#t=toc |
| Summary: |
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work. |
| Carrier Form: | 1 online resource (xxiii,391pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9789812818478 (electronic bk.) |
| CLC: | O225 |
| Contents: | I. Limits, continuity and robustness. 1. Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games / D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. 2. Limit games and limit equilibria / D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. 3. Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players / D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. 4. Finite player approximations to a continuum of players / D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. 5. On the robustness of equilibrium refinements / D. Fudenberg, D. M. Kreps and D. K. Levine. 6. When are nonanonymous players negligible? / D. Fudenberg, D. K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer -- I |