Statutory default rules:how to interpret unclear legislation

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Elhauge Einer
Published: Harvard University Press,
Publisher Address: Cambridge, MA
Publication Dates: 2008.
Literature type: Book
Language: English
Subjects:
Carrier Form: vi, 386 p.: ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN: 9780674024601 (alk. paper)
0674024605 (alk. paper)
Index Number: D971
CLC: D971.2
Call Number: D971.2/E41
Contents: Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining se