Statutory default rules:how to interpret unclear legislation
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Main Authors: | |
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Published: |
Harvard University Press,
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Publisher Address: | Cambridge, MA |
Publication Dates: | 2008. |
Literature type: | Book |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Carrier Form: | vi, 386 p.: ill. ; 24 cm. |
ISBN: |
9780674024601 (alk. paper) 0674024605 (alk. paper) |
Index Number: | D971 |
CLC: | D971.2 |
Call Number: | D971.2/E41 |
Contents: | Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining se |